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Investigation of JTAG and ISP Techniques for Forensic Procedures 
Abstract: 
This thesis is focusing on JTAG and ISP physical acquisitions techniques. These techniques 
were created from manufactures to test PCBs and repair devices but they are being used as 
a forensic technique to acquire the data from a device. The aim is to give an overview of 
these techniques from a forensic point of view and in addition to some other tests will try 
to prove that are forensically equivalent to any other method. The first test will focus on 
showing the differences on the different types of acquisition by comparing the results of a 
forensic analysis of the same device using Cellebrite UFED Touch and Physical Analyzer. 
The second test will try to prove that all physical acquisitions are equivalent by comparing 
the acquired data from the same device with two different methods. Finally, the last test 
will focus on the examination of the content of an encrypted device to show if it is possible 
to find evidences. 
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JTAG ja ISP meetodite kasutamine kriminalistikas 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Antud töö teemaks on andmete füüsiline kopeerimine kasutades JTAG ja ISP meetodit. 
Need meetodid olid algselt loodud tootja poolt mikrokontrollerite (PCB) parandamaks ja 
testimiseks, samas on võimalik neid meetodeid kasutada IT kriminalistikas 
mobiilseadmetelt andmete kätte saamiseks. Käesoleva töö eesmärk on kirjeldada üldiselt 
neid meetodeid ning testide kaudu näidata, et tulemused on samaväärsed võrreldes 
igapäevaste mobiilseadmete kriminalistikas kasutatavatega. Esimese testi eesmärgiks on 
tuua välja  erinevusi erinevate kopeerimismeetodite vahel. Tulemuste võrdlemiseks on 
kasutatud Cellebrite UFED Touch ja Physical analyzer tarkvara. Teise testi eesmärk on 
näidata, et kõik füüsilise kopeerimise meetodid on samaväärsed. Selleks tuleb võrrelda kahe 
erineva meetodiga saadud andmeid ühelt ja samalt seadmelt. Viimase testi eesmärk on 
näidata, kas on võimalik leida soovitud andmeid seadmelt, mis on krüpteeritud. 
Võtmesõnad: 
Android, Kohtu, JTAG, ISP, eMMC, Omandamine, , Füüsiline, Loogiline 
CERCS: P170, Arvutiteadus, arvutusmeetodid, süsteemid, juhtimine 
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1 Introduction 
Smartphones have become an integral part of people’s daily life; in 2014, smartphone users 
were 1.57 billion while in 2016 this number increased to 2.1 billion and by 2020 it is ex-
pected to go up to 2.87 billion, globally [1]. Smartphones are pocket-sized computers in 
which you can browse the Internet, chat, send emails, create and read documents and books, 
use GPS to navigate, keep notes and a lot of other functions. When these valuable functions 
are combined with the fact that people tend to carry their phones everywhere, smartphones 
become a goldmine of evidences in criminal cases. 
The plethora of artefacts in devices like smartphones created the need of a science that its 
main goal is to examine these devices for evidences and report them in a clear way for later 
use in court, thus mobile forensics emerged, which is a sub-branch of the main science of 
digital forensics. Mobile forensics is relatively a new area but it is growing fast as forensic 
examiners are dealing with mobile devices more often than before. 
Mobile forensics is the science dedicated to analyzing mobile devices for evidences. The 
forensic process consists of the collection of evidences, data acquisition, analysis of the 
data and report the evidences. In mobile forensics, data acquisition and analysis it can be 
one step or two different steps depends on the method and technique used. The methods for 
data acquisition can be divided in three types: logical, file system and physical acquisition. 
Logical acquisition is a “bit-by-bit” copy of logical storage objects (e.g. files) that reside 
on a logical storage while physical acquisition is bit-by-bit copy of the physical storage 
(e.g. flash memory), as quoted from Wikipedia [2]. File system acquisition can provide 
information for files that are deleted but not overwritten if the device allows file system 
access. Each type of acquisition has a variety of techniques for data acquisition such as 
“nandroid” backup (only for Android devices) and “logical acquisition” using “UFED 
Touch” for the logical acquisition and JTAG1, ISP2, chip-off or “dd” command for the 
physical acquisition. The examiner has to choose which method will be used based on the 
case’s needs, the available tools, device(s) for analysis and also his skills. 
This thesis is focusing on the data acquisition part of the forensics process and not on the 
post-acquisition analysis, as a high amount of research has been done already. The aim of 
this thesis is to examine JTAG and ISP acquisitions as forensic techniques, provide to the 
forensic community an overview of these techniques and information on how to perform 
an acquisition with them. More precisely, this study’s goal is to examine if these two tech-
niques are valuable and admissible as any other physical acquisition technique and also to 
provide a step-by-step tutorial on how to perform these two acquisitions. As these tech-
niques requires some connections on device’s PCB, a step-by-step tutorial on how to iden-
tify the eMMC TAPs3 used for the ISP acquisition will be provided. JTAG TAPs identifi-
cation is out of the scope of this thesis. To provide a more complete study, a comparison of 
the evidences that can be found with different acquisition methods will be conducted as 
well as an examination of a full disk image from an encrypted device. By finishing this 
thesis, the forensic examiner will be able to find all the information needed to perform 
JTAG and ISP acquisition along with tools and possible risks. The limitation of this study 
is the variety on devices for test and the access in proper tools. 
For the purposes of this thesis two devices will be used, the Samsung Galaxy S4 I9505 
using Android 5.1 and the Nokia Lumia 635. The Nokia device will be used for the eMMC 
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TAP identification and ISP acquisition while the Samsung device will be used as a test 
device for JTAG acquisition, comparison of the different acquisition methods and exami-
nation of a disk image of an encrypted device. 
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2 Background 
Before the experiment starts, some theoretical background is required that covers what fo-
rensic is, information about acquisition types and techniques, best practices and work that 
has been conducted. 
2.1 Android File System and Partition Layout 
Android is the dominant OS4 for smartphones on the market with 86.8% of global market 
share as it was measured on the third quarter of 2016 [3]. Android uses a variety of file 
systems, the partition which stores user’s data, the only forensic valuable partition, uses 
EXT, FAT32 and YAFFS25 [4]. Proprietary file systems can be found as well such as 
Samsung’s RFS file system. Also, virtual file systems, that are not written to any physical 
device, exist in Android such as “proc” (information for kernel,  
processes and configuration parameters) and “rootfs” (where kernel mount root file sys-
tem at startup). The “/proc/filesystem” file provides information about the file systems 
supported by Linux kernel and by extension from Android. 
Partition layout differs between Android devices made by different manufacturers but some 
partitions are common in all devices, these partitions are [4]: 
• Boot Loader 
Stores boot loader program.  
• Boot 
Contains Linux kernel and RAMdisk. Without it, the device can boot only in  
recovery mode. 
• System 
Contains the Android OS only, not the kernel and RAMdisk. 
• Data or userdata 
Contains user’s data such as photos, music, applications etc.  
• Cache 
Contains frequently accessed data and app components.  
• Recovery 
Contains a second complete Linux system with kernel and special recovery binary 
used to boot in recovery mode. Useful for repairing a device if the boot partition is 
destroyed or flashed with wrong kernel. 
• Radio 
Contains baseband image, responsible for telephony activities. 
This is the external card and not a partition from the internal memory. 
These are the main partitions of an Android device but more partitions can be found be-
tween devices of different manufactures, the most valuable partition from a forensic stand-
point is “data” or “userdata” partition. 
2.2 Digital Forensic  
Forensic science consists of several branches and one of them is digital forensics with its 
main purpose being the recovery and investigation of material found in digital evidences 
[5]. Digital forensics can be divided further into sub-branches such as forensic data analysis, 
computer, network and mobile forensics.  
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The process from the seizure of an exhibit, exhibit is the devices for investigation in legal 
terminology, until the creation of a report is called digital forensics process [6]. The stages 
of this process are:  
• Seizure 
Digital forensic technicians gather the exhibits from the crime scene. 
• Acquisition 
Exact sector or forensic duplicate of the media is created for analysis. The analysis 
should never be done in the original device, only in case of live analysis at the crime 
scene. 
• Analysis 
Digital forensic examiner performs analysis of the exhibits to gather evidences us-
ing different methods and tools. 
• Report 
Report with the findings of the analysis. 
The personnel responsible for this process can be separated broadly in two levels, the digital 
forensic technicians and the digital forensic examiners [5]. Technicians are responsible to 
gather or process evidences in crime scene and sometimes they may have to perform a “live 
analysis” of evidence. Technicians should be trained to handle the exhibits appropriately. 
Examiners on the other hand specialize in only one area. 
2.3 Data Acquisition 
In mobile forensics, data acquisition is divided in different levels/types. According to 
SWGDE Best Practices for Mobile Phone Forensic [7], these levels are: 
1. Manual: Use of the device itself to look for evidences manually. 
2. Logical: Extraction of file system’s portion. 
3. File System: Provides access to the file system. 
4. Physical (Non-Invasive): Physical acquisition of a phone’s data without disassem-
bling the phone. 
5. Physical (Invasive): Physical acquisition of a phone’s data that requires disassembly 
of the device to access the PCB (JTAG/ISP). 
6. Chip-off: Removal of the chip from the PCB for analysis. 
7. MicroRead: High-power microscope is used for a physical view of the electronic 
circuitry of memory. 
This thesis is focusing mostly on level 5 data acquisition of mobile’s memory. 
2.3.1 Logical Acquisition 
Logical acquisition is a bit-by-bit image acquisition of logical storage objects that reside on 
a logical storage or, in other words, the allocated data. This type of acquisition is performed 
by utilizing a designated API [8]. Some logical acquisition techniques are explained in this 
paragraph. Note that these two techniques are available only to Android devices.  
2.3.1.1  ADB Pull 
ADB6 is a command line tool found in Android SDK, which allows the user to communicate 
with an Android device [4]. ADB provides lots of commands [9] but the most useful from 
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the forensic standpoint is the “pull” command because it is used to get data from the con-
nected device. The prerequisite to use this command, and any other command of the ADB, 
is to have the developer’s mode and USB debugging option enabled on the device. If the 
device has not root access, the ADB daemon on the device runs with shell privileges, similar 
to non-root access on Linux terminal, which has as a result limited access to forensically 
relevant files. An example of useful files that can be pulled are unencrypted apps, “tmpfs” 
file system, which may include user’s data and other readable directories. When the device 
is rooted, or uses a custom ROM then it is easy to pull everything form the device. 
2.3.1.2  Backup Analysis 
The backup analysis techinque relies on the analysis of the user’s backup [4]. During the 
first years of its use, Android did not provide any backup mechanism for user’s data which 
had as a result Android users relying on third-party applications to backup their data. The 
backup was usually stored in SD card or in the Cloud. This backup usually consists of user’s 
files such as pictures, videos and documents, but for rooted users some applications can 
also back application’s data as well. In addition, rooted users have a more powerful 
technique for backing up their data that is called “nandroid“. Nandroid backup can be 
achieved in two different ways; either by booting the device in recovery mode, custom 
recovery is needed with the two most known and used CWM7 and TWRP8, or using an 
application such as “Online Nandroid Backup“, both options require root [10]. Nandroid 
backup is creating an image that contains user’s data and system files as well.  
2.3.2 Physical Acquisition 
Physical acquisition is a bit-by-bit copy of the physical storage and it can be invasive, 
JTAG, ISP or Chip-off, or non-invasive, with the use of “dd” command. The difference, 
from the forensic point of view, between physical and logical acquisition is that in physical 
acquisition deleted files may be recovered and the slack space can be examined. A brief 
comparison of the evidences that can be found with these techniques can be seen on the 
paragraph 4.1. 
2.3.2.1  JTAG  
IEEE 1149.1 [11] is the Standard Test Access Port and Boundary-Scan architecture for TAP 
used for testing printed PCBs9 using boundary scan is known as JTAG. JTAG was created 
for testing purposes but in the recent past it started being used in mobile forensic science to 
perform a low level raw content acquisition of the flash memory. JTAG is a non-destructive 
invasive method which means that the device needs to be disassembled (invasive) but after 
the acquisition it can be used again (non-destructive). The JTAG process requires a con-
nection of a hardware, flash box, to the device’s PCB test access points via solder, Molex 
cable or jig and a computer [12]. Most times soldering will be needed so tools and hands-
on experience on micro-soldering is needed. The most known flash box that supports JTAG 
is Riff box, other boxes are ATF10 and Z3X. JTAG is a technique that utilizes the processor 
for memory acquisition. The process requires firstly to connect device’s JTAG TAPs with 
a flash box, the box to a computer and lastly to setup flash box’s software, When everything 
is connected and the software is setup correctly the flash box will instruct the processor via 
the test access points to acquire the raw data stored on the chip, then the processor will reply 
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with the data which will travel back following the same path from memory to the processor 
and out from the TAPs to JTAG box and finally to the computer; this process describes 
steps 3 and 4 from the JTAG acquisition process [13]. The JTAG acquisition process con-
sists of: 
1. Device disassembly 
2. Find TAPs on the PCB 
3. Connect JTAG Box, which is connected to the computer, to the corresponding TAP 
on the PCB 
4. Acquire chip image with the use of JTAG’s Box software 
5. Disconnect the JTAG and assemble the device 
JTAG’s main drawback is that not all devices are JTAG-able and this can happen, as Jenise 
Reyes-Rodriguez explains on his presentation, because [13]: 
• Device may not have TAPs 
• Device is not supported by JTAG box 
• Processor may be supported but: 
o TAPs configuration has not been discovered (iOS devices) 
o TAPs may be disabled or shut down by OS 
o Fuse in processor may be bad 
If the TAPs are known but the device is not supported, the examiner can look for the de-
vice’s processor and use another’s device profile which uses the same processor. If TAPs 
are not known, the examiner can try to identify them by probing each TAP on the PCB until 
he has all the TAPs needed, tools and software is needed. The TAPs needed for JTAG are 
the following, as described from SWGDE11 [14]: 
• TDI (Test Data Input): shows the data shifted into the device’s test or programming 
logic.  
• TDO (Test Data Output): shows the data shifted out of the device.  
• TMS (Test Mode Select): samples at the rising edge of TCK to determine the next 
state. 
• TCK (Test Clock Input): synchronizes the internal state machine operations. 
• TRST (Test Reset): resets the TAP controller’s state machine to a known state. 
Other TAPs used for JTAG may include: 
• GND (Ground): may be pad or known ground source on the device 
• RTCK (Return Test Clock): Listens for the return signal to achieve adaptive clock-
ing. 
• SRT (System Reset): Power cycles the device. 
• VREF (Voltage Reference: Indicates signal levels. 
• VCC (Voltage collector): Supplies powers. 
For JTAG TAPs if  flash box’s software does not provide them, the examiner should search 
on the internet or in forums with the two following being the most known http://fo-
rum.gsmhosting.com/ and http://www.unlockforum.com/; as the information on these fo-
rums is based on the users everything should be tested in a second device before use it in a 
real case. The TAPs also can be found by probing TAPs on the PCB until everything is 
known. Finally, information regarding the JTAG test access points can be found on device’s 
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schematics but these files are confidential and manufacturer should be contacted in order 
to acquired them. 
2.3.2.2 ISP 
ISP is an acquisition technique similar to JTAG with its main difference being that ISP 
connects directly to the eMMC or eMCP flash memory, it bypasses the processor. In ISP, 
as in JTAG, the examiner needs to know the TAPs that connects to the memory and a flash 
box. The process requires firstly to connect eMMC TAPs with a flash box that supports 
eMMC read/write operations, connect the flash box with a computer and setup the flash 
box’s software. When everything is connected, the software is setup correctly and the con-
nection between flash box and eMMC has been established the content of the memory can 
be read.  
Finding the TAPs for the eMMC is the same as mention in paragraph 2.3.2.1 for JTAG, if 
flash box’s software does not provide them, then internet and forums, if none of these works 
then the examiner can find them manually by probing each TAP on PCB and he knows all 
TAPs needed, for this process ATF box and an adapter is needed as well as a second device 
identical to the original one for testing purposes, more details on paragraph 4.4. Finally, 
information regarding the eMMC TAPs can be found on device’s schematics. As in ISP 
acquisition the connection is directly to the memory chip the acquisition process is faster 
than JTAG. Also, it can be used when a device is not JTAG-able. The TAPs needed are the 
following, as described from Kingston Technology in more details in eMMC Specification 
Ver 4.4, 4.41 & 4.5 [15]:  
• CMD: Command in/ Response out 
• DATA0: Data input / output 
• CLK: Clock  
• VCC: Supply voltage for Core (3.3V) 
• VCCQ: Supply voltage for I/O (1.8 – 3.3V) 
• GND: Ground 
It should be mentioned that ISP acquisition applies to any eMMC or eMCP flash memory, 
thus is not limited to phones but to any device utilizing these memories, such as SD cards. 
2.3.2.3  Chip-off 
Chip-off is an advanced technique for data extraction that requires firstly to remove the chip 
from the device and then specialized equipment to mount the chip and create an image of 
the raw data [16]. Chip-off is not limited only to mobile phones but it can also be used in 
other devices that utilize flash memory, such as GPS and vehicle components. The chip-off 
process consists of four steps: 
1. Remove chip from the device. 
2. Clean and repair the chip. 
3. Image acquisition with the use of specialized equipment 
4. Analysis of the image with standard forensic tools. 
This technique should be used only if there is no other alternative. Chip-off not only re-
quires expensive equipment, but the examiner should be experienced and skilled as well. 
Apart from the method with the expensive equipment there is another way to read the 
memory but is not recommended. This method is actually an ISP acquisition but instead of 
connecting on device’s TAPs the flash box connects directly on TAPs on the chip. As the 
chip can be destroyed during the chip-off process it should be done only by experts. 
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2.3.2.4  dd command 
The “dd” command method is a non-invasive physical acquisition technique which makes 
use of Linux “dd’ command. This command is used to copy and convert files but forensics 
examiners are using it to create bit-by-bit images of drives [17]. As Android is based on 
Linux, if the device meets some requirements this command can be used to acquire a parti-
tion or a full disk image, these requirements are that the device must be rooted with Busy-
Box installed and the “developer’s mode with USB debugging” option must be enabled. 
The process to root a device differs between devices. If these requirements are fulfilled, 
then the examiner has to boot the device into custom recovery mode and connect the device 
to a computer, then again with the ADB tool should start looking for the partition he wants 
to acquire; this can be done by inspecting the “/proc/partitions” file for information about 
the partitions on the device, for Samsung Galaxy S4 partitions can be seen in Figure 1. For 
full disk image, the first (root) block should be chosen. In case the examiner does not need 
the entire memory and wants a specific partition, he will have to look for information that 
maps each block to a name; the “by-name” directory usually contains this information as in 
Figure 2. It should be mentioned that not all devices have this directory and it is not on the 
same path on all devices. Other commands that the examiner may use to find information 
for the partitions are “mount” or “cat /proc/mounts”, “cat /proc/emmc”, “cat /proc/mtd” and 
finally “cat /proc/yaffs” for older devices and “fstab” file (usually called fstab. <device>) 
for newer devices. Some information regarding the process can be seen in paragraph 4.2 
Once, the examiner has the name of the block-device (partition) the following commands 
should be executed: 
 
Figure 1 Samsung Galaxy S4 partitions 
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Terminal 1 
• adb forward tcp:1111 tcp:1111 
• adb shell 
• /system/xbin/busybox nc -l -p 1111 -e /system/xbin/busybox dd 
if=/dev/block/mmcblk0 
Terminal 2 
• adb forward tcp:1111 tcp:1111 
• nc 127.0.0.1 1111 | pv -i 1> mmcblk0.raw 
Important notes: 
• For Windows systems, “Netcat” and “pv” from Cygwin should be installed 
• Commands for terminal 2 should be executed in Cygwin terminal. 
• Any port can be used as long as it is the same in all commands. 
• The path for BusyBox may differ, depending on if the folder BusyBox was installed; 
“/system/xbin” is the default folder. 
• The path for the block may be different between devices 
• Block name should be the name of the partition for extraction, root one if full 
memory needed. 
 
Figure 2 Samsung Galaxy S4 partitions by name 
2.3.3 Cellebrite UFED Touch 
Cellebrite is a company that has expertise in the field of mobile data technologies; one of 
the tools they have created is the UFED Touch. Their latest product is UFED Touch 2, 
which is a portable device for forensic analysis of devices such as smartphones and GPS. 
UFED Touch supports all three types of data acquisition logical, file system and physical 
[8]. For logical acquisition, UFED Touch loads the appropriate API to the device and then 
makes read-only requests to obtain data such as text messages and pictures. Logical is the 
fastest acquisition method but the time it varies, based on the available files on the device. 
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File system acquisition is similar to the logical one but it uses different built-in protocols 
for the acquisition of the file system. In some cases, to obtain files that are not accessible 
through the API, this method relies on available device backup files. Files that might be 
found with file system acquisition are user deleted and hidden data from SQLite databases. 
As in the logical acquisition, the time for this method depends on the files stored on the 
device. 
For a physical acquisition, UFED uses the device in “rescue mode” or “download mode” 
which allows the insertion of code, bootloader, into the RAM during start-up. It is most 
likely that UFED makes use of the “dd” command to get a full disk image; this is just a 
hypothesis though and it has not been verified. Cellebrite uses bootloaders that have been 
made by them specifically for the devices they support. The code consists of read actions 
only to extract data without altering anything. The read data is sent to the UFED Touch 
which then writes it on a binary file on the computer or a removable memory such as an SD 
card. This is the most time-consuming method and the time needed is based solely on the 
size of the memory. 
There are cases in which UFED may need to temporary root the device or permanently 
change the device’s bootloader in order to be able to get an image of the memory. These 
methods are leaving footprints and may overwrite data in unallocated space but they can be 
admissible in the court if documented properly. 
2.4 Best Practices 
Best practices are rules that everyone who handles exhibits should follow. These rules are 
non-binding but it is highly recommended for everyone to follow them in order to eliminate 
possible objections in the court and also to eliminate the chances of an evidence not being 
admissible in the court. Best practices can be found at SWGDE. The relevant best practices 
for this thesis can be found in SWGDE Best Practices for Mobile Phone Forensics [7] and 
SWGDE Best Practices for Examining Mobile Phones Using JTAG [14]. 
2.4.1 Handling Evidence 
Mobile phones, and any other device, apart from the digital evidences they may also have 
traditional evidences, such as finger prints and DNA, thus further analysis is needed. As 
OS gives us the opportunity to completely wipe memory remotely and in order to prevent 
any data alteration, the mobile phone should be isolated from the network (cellular and 
internet). The examiner should always take precautions for safety reasons and finally, the 
evidences should always be processed according to policy in order to maintain a chain of 
custody. 
2.4.2 Equipment Preparation 
Any tool or software used for data extraction and analysis of the evidence should be tested 
and verified before it can be used to ensure its performance. Documents related to soft-
ware/hardware should be reviewed from time to time and also, they should be accessible. 
On this website http://www.cftt.nist.gov/, NIST validation reports for some tools can be 
found. The reports are about capabilities and limitations of the tools.  
2.4.3 Data Acquisition 
In data acquisition, the examiner should pay attention to some key points. Firstly, he has to 
keep isolated evidence from different devices to avoid cross-contamination. In addition, he 
has to document the mobile phone’s physical condition, as well as the data acquisition 
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method. Finally, after the acquisition, he needs to verify that the data between the mobile 
phone and the acquired data are identical. 
2.4.4 JTAG 
As mentioned before, not all devices are JTAG-able and traditional forensics methods 
should be attempted first [14]. Some of the cases that JTAG is a good candidate are for 
damaged devices or devices that are password-protected, when “USB debugging” mode is 
disabled, when non-invasive acquisition is not possible or logical acquisition is insufficient. 
2.4.4.1  Training 
Examiners that perform JTAG acquisition should have proper training which covers topics 
such as boundary scanning overview, how to remove the PCB on mobile devices, solder-
ing/de-soldering, TAPs identification, electronics and finally how to handle evidences and 
procedures in digital forensic. 
2.4.4.2  JTAG Process 
• Preparation 
• Disassembly 
• TAPs Identification 
• Connectivity 
• Configuration 
• Extraction 
• Preservation 
• Hashing 
2.4.5 Documentation 
The organization sets the policies that the examiners must follow which should cover at 
least how to handle evidences, how to examine the information and report the findings. 
2.4.5.1  Evidence handling 
The documentation about evidence handling should include: copy of legal authority, chain 
of custody, photographs and detailed description of the devices and finally photographs of 
any visible damage and information regarding the packaging. Of course, the documentation 
is not limited to these topics only. 
2.4.5.2  Examination  
Any document regarding the examination of the evidences should be preserved according 
to policy and should provide enough information to the extent that enables another exam-
iner to repeat the findings independently. It should also include tools and software used, as 
well as problems faced during the data acquisition (e.g. faulty cables). 
2.4.5.3  Report of findings 
The report of findings should include information regarding the purpose of the examination, 
the examiner’s information (e.g. name) and date, a detailed description of the examined 
device, other reports related to the examination and answers to the investigator’s specific 
requests. Moreover, the report should provide all information in a clear and concise manner 
and finally, it should be reviewed according to organizational policy. 
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2.4.6 Archive 
Once a case is finished, all files related should be archived according to organizational pol-
icy and all applicable laws. In some cases, it may be necessary to archive the specific ver-
sion of the tool used as well. 
2.5 Related Work 
A high amount of research has been done already regarding smartphone forensics and more 
precisely for Android. Most topics are covering either logical acquisition techniques or the 
post-acquisition analysis. The post-acquisition analysis can be focused, such as Vsevolod 
Djagilev’s thesis which focuses on finding evidences from chat applications in Android 
[18] in which he is trying to solve the problem of missing support in commercial software 
XRY [19]. Other post-acquisition analysis can be more generic, like a general guideline, 
such as the article about “Simplifying Cell Phone Examination” from SSDDFJ12 [20]. An-
drew Hoog on his book “Android Forensics: Investigation, Analysis, and Mobile Security 
for Google Android” [4] has given plenty of information for Android Forensics, such as 
Android supported file systems, acquisition techniques, Android history et cetera.  
When it comes to JTAG and ISP, the information from a forensic standpoint is mostly fo-
cused on using these techniques for other purposes without giving enough information on 
how to use them, an example of this is this very important study that have been done which 
focuses on showing weather data integrity is maintained during acquisition of an Android 
device or not [21]. In order to achieve that, they acquired data multiple times with CRMI13 
and JTAG, if it was possible, and then they compared all the hash values of the acquired 
data Figure 3.This study showed that both techniques maintain user data integrity. 
Another way that JTAG has been used is as a tool for detecting kernel rootkits in Android 
devices, they created a framework called JoKER or JTAG observe kernel using RIFF Box 
JTAG controller as a way to communicate with the Android device [22]. For the detection 
of rootkits, firstly they are halting the core of the device by sending halt command that is 
available on JTAG, then they extract some an object from memory areaa related to the 
kernel and finally, they analyze the obtained memory for suspicious modifications, if a 
modification has been found then the system stops, otherwise extracts the next object and 
follows the same steps. This process stops when a suspicious modification has been found 
or all four objects supported from JoKER have been analyzed. 
More studies may have been done regarding JTAG and ISP acquisition but as technology 
is moving forward in a very fast pace with new devices and new versions of Android being 
launched quite often, some of the previously conducted research may be already obsolete 
and some methods may not be applicable to this moment. 
                                                 
12 Small Scale Digital Device Forensics Journal 
13 Custom Recovery Mode Image 
17 
 
 
Figure 3 Experimentation processes [21]  
 
Figure 4 JoKER detection flow [22] 
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3 Test Cases Overview 
This chapter will give a brief explanation of the tests which will be conducted on this thesis, 
the aim of each test and the expected results.  
3.1 Data acquisition types comparison with Cellebrite UFED Touch  
The first experiment will be a comparison of the evidences that can be found with the three 
types of data acquisition logical, file system and physical. This experiment will give an 
overview of the differences on the evidences that can be found with each method. The de-
vice which will be used is a rooted Samsung Galaxy S4 LTE (GT-I9505) with BusyBox 
installed and Android 5.0.1 and for the all data acquisitions will be taken with Cellebrite 
UFED Touch. Apart from the changes on the software of the device (custom recovery, root 
and BusyBox), the device was slightly used to send/receive e-mails and instant messages, 
browse the internet and copy/delete some media files. A full list of what was done to the 
device prior to acquisition can be found in the Appendix II. The experiment will start with 
logical acquisition which is the fastest and most common acquisition, then with the file 
system one and lastly with the most time-consuming physical acquisition. It is expected 
that logical acquisition will provide the least amount of evidences the while physical one 
will provide the biggest amount of evidences. Furthermore, with the physical acquisition it 
may be possible to find some of the deleted files which is not expected from the logical 
one.  
3.2 Physical acquisition techniques comparison: UFED Touch vs “dd" 
command 
This experiment will compare a full disk image taken with the “dd” command and full disk 
image taken with UFED Touch exactly after the first one was finished. The aim of this test 
is to compare the outputs of these two techniques and check if different physical acquisition 
techniques are equivalent. It is expected to be, and taking into consideration the result of 
the research on user’s data integrity during acquisition of Android devices [21], it will be a 
verification that no matter which physical acquisition technique (Ufed Touch, JTAG, ISP 
or dd command) is being used the results will be the same and admissible in a court. 
3.3 Working with Encrypted Device 
For this test, the same device will be encrypted, then an image will be acquired using “dd” 
command and in the end, will be analyzed for evidences. The purpose of this experiment is 
to check if a physical acquisition of an encrypted device can provide any information when 
the device is encrypted. 
3.4 eMMC TAP Identification 
 In order to perform ISP acquisition the examiner needs to know the TAPs that connects 
directly to the eMMC. There are few possible ways to find the pins needed for this operation 
and they have been mentioned on the paragraph 2.3.2.2. This paragraph will be dedicated 
to the method which uses ATF box’s eMMC finder module. ATF Nitro box will be used 
with “ATF-V2 4in1 Adapter for ATF Box” and ATF’s software version 12.67. The device 
which will be used for this test is “Nokia Lumia 635”. The aim of this test is to provide a 
method on how to perform TAP identification for the eMMC using ATF box in order to get 
a full disk image after. 
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3.5 ISP 
This paragraph will be dedicated on memory acquisition utilizing the In-System Program-
ming technique and it continues from where the previous paragraph stopped. How to per-
form and ISP acquisition with the use of ATF box will be explained and any problems that 
may appear during the procedure. Finally, the disk image obtained will be loaded to UFED 
for forensic analysis. 
3.6 JTAG 
This paragraph will be dedicated to memory acquisition with JTAG, for the test Riff box 
and JTAG jig for Samsung S4 I9505 will be used. How to perform JTAG acquisition will 
be explained as well as any problems that may appear during the acquisition. Moreover, the 
file obtained will be compared to the ones obtained in the previous paragraph with UFED 
and “dd” command. It is expected of the files to be identical and provide the same infor-
mation when scanned for evidences with forensic tools. 
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4 Testing and Comparing Forensic Acquisition Techniques with 
Tutorial 
This chapter is dedicated on the practical part of this thesis. In this chapter, the tests held in 
this thesis will be explained in details and a method on how to perform JTAG and ISP 
acquisition will be given. Finally, data acquisition types will be compare in order to show 
the differences on the evidences that can be found with each type. 
4.1 Data acquisition types comparison with Cellebrite UFED Touch 
Cellebrite UFED Touch supports a big number of devices, and not only smartphones, and 
different methods of data acquisition, these methods may not be available in all devices. 
What this paragraph will try to show is the outcome of these methods and a comparison of 
the evidences they can provide. As this is not the focusing point of this thesis the data ac-
quisition process will be explained briefly and the comparison will not be in depth.  
The data acquisition with UFED Touch is very simple and UFED Touch has step by step 
instructions on the screen. The steps for the acquisition are the following: 
1. Search and select the device on UFED Touch. If the device is not available then, it 
means that it is not supported. 
2. Choose the type of acquisition, Logical, File System, Physical. 
At this point UFED Touch will provide all information needed for the connection 
with the device and the acquisition process. 
3. Setup the device according to the instructions on UFED Touch screen. 
4. Connect the device with the cable mentioned on the instructions. Cables comes with 
UFED Touch. 
5. Start the acquisition. Sometimes the acquisition might fail, in that case acquisition 
should start from step 1. Also, there are cases in which UFED Touch failed to start 
the acquisition even when it was saying that the device is supported. 
6. When the acquisition is over, check Cellebrite software on the PC for the analysis 
results. 
The process is similar for all devices, nevertheless some changes to the settings they may 
be needed to be done on the device and the cables to use. Figure 5 shows the setup during 
the physical acquisition of Samsung Galaxy S4. 
Cellebrite UFED Touch software provides a summary page for the analysis in which the 
examiner can see information regarding the type of the acquisition, the device and the evi-
dences found; evidences are categorized into “Phone Data” and “Data Files”. Data files 
refers to actual files such as images, documents and databases while phone data refers to 
information that can be found after analyzing the content of stored files such as cookies. 
Figure 36 shows the type and the number of evidences found for each acquisition.  
As it can be seen in Table 2, the information on phone data is roughly the same in all three 
acquisitions. Apart from the fact that with physical acquisition it was possible to find infor-
mation regarding SMS and instant messages, which was not possible with the other two 
acquisitions, and also information about application usage and device users which was not 
available only in logical acquisition rest of the results, the important ones, are almost iden-
tical. The only big difference was on the number of installed applications. 
In data files on the other hand, Table 1, the differences on available evidences are big and 
very easily seen. As happened with phone data, file system acquisition returned more cate-
gories comparing to logical one and physical acquisition found even more than the file 
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system, but the big difference was not on the available categories but in the number of files 
found. The most noteworthy differences can be found on images and texts, with physical 
acquisition providing 1651 more images and 807 more text files than logical acquisition 
and 621 images and 234 text files more than file system. Finally, one of the most important 
reasons why physical acquisition should be chosen if the evidences from the other two are 
not enough is the deleted files. For this case, some files were deleted before the acquisition, 
and as it can be seen on the Figure 7 one of these files, “Watercolor Lion.jpg”, was found 
only on physical acquisition, it was not possible to recover the file but it was possible to 
find indicators of its existence as well as a thumbnail, Figure 6. 
 
Figure 5 UFED Touch Physical Acquisition Samsung Galaxy S4 
Summing all up, in terms of information regarding phone usage all three acquisitions can 
provide almost the same evidences, but when it comes to actual files and deleted files as 
well, physical acquisition will provide the most. Finally, as logical acquisition is the fastest 
(depends on available files on the device) and physical acquisition is the most time-con-
suming and the difference on the evidences for phone usage is not big, it is recommended 
to always start with logical acquisition and move to file system or physical one if is neces-
sary. 
Table 1 Data Files Evidences 
Data Files Logical File System Physical 
Applications - - 1935 
Audio - 132 133 
Configurations - 53 54 
Databases 127 254 254 
Documents - 8 11 
Images 503 1533 2154 
Text 237 810 1044 
Uncategorized 1704 3852 5214 
Videos 3 4 7 
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Table 2 Phone Data Evidences 
Phone Data 
Logi-
cal File System Physical 
Application Usage - 223 223 
Cell Towers 3 3 3 
Chats 1 1 1 
Contacts 2 3 3 
Cookies 178 178 178 
Device Locations 91 91 91 
Device Users - 2 2 
Emails 12 12 12 
Installed Applications 40 41 219 
Instant Messages - - 129 
Passwords 1 2 2 
Powering Events 4 7 8 
SMS Messages - - 2 
Searched Items 7 7 7 
User Accounts 12 13 13 
Web History 36 36 36 
Wireless Networks 84 85 85 
 
Figure 6 Deleted image, Watercolor Lion.jpg thumbnail 
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Figure 7 Deleted Images tab UFED Touch 
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4.2 Cellebrite UFED Touch and dd Physical Full Disk Image Comparison 
For this part, a full disk image obtained with UFED Touch was compared with a one taken 
from custom recovery with the “dd” command, information about the process of physical 
acquisition through recovery mode with the “dd” command can be found in the Appendix 
III. Firstly, the disk image with “dd” command was taken and then with UFED Touch. This 
order was chosen to minimize the use of the device between the acquisition as well as to 
minimize the possibilities of files changing. In order for UFED to be able to perform phys-
ical acquisition, it loads its own bootloader, which means it would be necessary after the 
acquisition to re-flash the custom recovery on the device resulting to lot of changes on the 
device.  
For the comparison two different tests were held, the first one was a comparison of the hash 
values of each partition and the second one a comparison of the forensic analysis of the 
given disk images with UFED Touch software “Physical Analyzer”. 
For the first test, the disk image from UFED Touch was extracted and the files were loaded 
into “HashMyFiles v2.21” to calculate the hash values. When finished, the same process 
was followed for the disk image from the “dd” command. In Figure 8 the “MD5” hash 
values for the partitions from both acquisitions can be seen with red being the partitions 
that are not identical. The comparison of the hash values showed that most partitions were 
the same, as it was expected. The recovery partition it was expected to be different as UFED 
loads its own bootloader, but as long as there is no full knowledge of what UFED changes 
exactly on the device it is hard to comment whether or not the changes on these partitions 
are justified. The only partition that was not expected to be different is the “userdata”, thus 
a more detailed examination is needed.  
 
Figure 8 Parititons hash values from UFED and dd full disk image. 
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For further investigation regarding the changes on “userdata” partition “FTK Imager” and 
a python script were used; the code of the script can be seen in the Appendix I. FTK Imager, 
has one option that exports a list of all files with hash values and some other information, 
so the first step was to load both “userdata” files into FTK Imager and get these lists. Once 
the lists were exported and formatted appropriately in a text file with the following structure 
“MD5, SHA1, File Path”, then were moved to the script’s folder and the script was executed 
showing the files that are different. 
The steps which the script does in order to achieve that are the following: 
1. Reads both text files and created dictionary of dictionaries for each file, one diction-
ary is for “userdata” partition from UFED and the other from “dd” command 
2. Checks if values on UFED dictionary values exists on “dd” dictionary 
3. Checks if values on “dd” dictionary exists on UFED dictionary 
4. Shows the files that each dictionary has but not the other 
Both dictionaries should be looped in order to have all the different files. The “key” for the 
dictionaries is the “MD5” value. The result of this comparison can be seen in Figure 9 and 
the code on the appendix I. The results in Figure 9 shows that the differences on “userdata” 
partition were made because of the unallocated space and changes on “File System” files 
such as “inode table” and “superblock”. 
After having shown that user’s data were not altered even if the hash values of “userdata“ 
partiton do not match, for the second test both files were loaded into “Cellebrite Physical 
Analyzer” for a forensics analysis. As it can be seen in Figure 10 and Figure 11, both par-
titions returned the same evidences. These two tests verified that physical acquisition with 
different techniques are equivalent in terms of recovered evidences but that also the integ-
rity of user’s data is maintained, thus no matter which physical acquisition method will be 
used the results will be the same and admissible in a court. 
 
Figure 9 Hash file comparion between UFED and dd userdata partition. 
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Figure 10 UFED analyis of the dd full disk image 
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Figure 11 UFED analysis of the UFED physical acquisition 
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4.3 Encrypted device 
For this test, the same as before was used but now was fully-encrypted with password 
“ttu123”. When the encryption was done, the device was booted into recovery mode and a 
full disk image was taken with “dd” command, the commands can be seen in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12 Full disk image of encrypted Samsung Galaxy S4 using dd comman. 
As in the previous test, the disk image was loaded to “Cellebrite Physical Analyzer” for a 
forensic analysis. The analysis, Figure 14, returned almost nothing, the images that were 
found were images that are stored in “aboot” partition Figure 13, and they needed to be 
unencrypted as they are used before the device is booted and decrypted. 
 
Figure 13 Unencrypted image from encrypted partition analysis 
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Figure 14 Extraction summary of encrypted full disk image 
Furthermore, the encrypted disk image was loaded into FTK Imager for a quick look into 
userdata partition. Comparing to a similar non-encrypted disk image it is easily seen that in 
the case of an encrypted partition even the file system cannot be identified, Figure 16 shows 
how an encrypted and unencrypted partition looks like. In order to verify that no infor-
mation of files, such as file names, cannot be found, a known file on the device was 
searched, as Figure 15 shows, in the encrypted dump the search did not find a match while 
in the unencrypted one indicators of the file was found, the specific file “liza.jpg”, was 
deleted from the device before the acquisition. 
 
Figure 15 Search for file on encrypted and unencrypted userdata partition 
 
Figure 16 FTK Imager Encrypted and Unencrypted userdata partition 
At the moment of this writing, Samsung’s encryption for Android versions 4.0.3 to 4.2.2 
has been cracked [23], Samsung is using its own encryption. For Android versions 5.0 and 
later the full disk encryption has been cracked but the vulnerabilities used, have been 
patched, some devices may be still vulnerable if the user has not updated the software. More 
information regarding the encryption cracking can be found here and here. 
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To sum up, if the device is encrypted, physical acquisition will produce an encrypted full 
disk image which will be forensically worthless as no information can be found. Under 
special circumstances, concerning old Android or outdated devices there is a chance for a 
decryption. It should be noted that companies that provide services for encrypted devices 
may exist but is not in this scope of this thesis. 
4.4 eMMC Test Point Identification 
This paragraph is focusing on the identification of the TAPs for the eMMC chip on Nokia 
Lumia 635 that allows the examiner to perform ISP acquisition. The ISP technique com-
municates directly with the memory chip without any interference from the CPU as hap-
pening in JTAG. This method can be used for other devices as the process is the same. For 
this process, the following tools are needed: 
1. ATF flash box 
2. ATF software 
3. ATF-V2 4in1 Adapter or ATF-V3 All-in-1 Ultimate Adapter14 or ATF EMMC Test 
Point Finder15 
4. 2 cables to provide power to the device and 1 as test point finder probe 
5. Soldering Iron 
6. Soldering Wire 0.04mm or 0.02mm. 
7. Digital Microscope 
8. Multimeter 
9. DC Power supplier (not mandatory) 
In this thesis, the following tools were used: 
1. ATF Lightning 
2. ATF software V12.67 
3. ATF-V2 4in1 Adapter 
4. Soldering iron 
5. Soldering wire 0.02mm 
6. 2x 1 pin female to crocodile clip wire 
7. 1x 1 pin female to male jumper wire 
4.4.1 ATF 4in1 Adapter setup 
The first step is to prepare the adapter, the following cables were used, Figure 17: 
1. 2x 1 pin female to crocodile clip wire to provide power from adapter to the device 
2. 1x 1 pin female to male jumper wire for testing purposes. The thinner the tip of the 
probing cable the better as in some cases the connections are tiny and close to each 
other. 
The female side of the red cable should connect on the voltage while the female side of the 
black cable should connect on the ground; the colors of the cables do not matter. The third 
cable should connect on the “green” pin on the ATF Adapter, which is the pin used for 
probing Figure 18. Instead of using 1 pin female connections on the ATF adapter the cable 
can be soldered directly on the adapter. The cables used on this test are just a recommenda-
tion, a cable with thinner tip for probing would be better. 
                                                 
14 ATF-V3 All in 1 Adapter comes with test point finder probe wire 
15 ATF eMMC Test point finder comes with all three cables needed 
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Figure 17 2x 1pin female to crocodile clip and 1x 1pin female to male jumper wire 
 
Figure 18 ATF-V2 4in1 Adapter 
4.4.2 ATF software setup 
Latest version of ATF supports CPUs from Qualcomm, Exynos Marvell PXA, Broadcom 
and Spreadtrum. The following steps will show how to prepare the software for TP identi-
fication. 
Step 1 
Connect ATF 4in1 adapter on ATF flash box, the ATF flash box on USB2.0 port on the 
computer and run ATF software.  
Step 2 
From the tab “Nokia Service” Select “ATF Plus” as phone generation and then on tab “Find 
eMMC TP”.  
Step 3 
Setup eMMC Test Point Finder. Figure 19 shows the settings used for Nokia Lumia 635. 
• CPU Type: The type of CPU that the device has. 
• Target: The testing points trying to identify. Always start with CLK and CMD, then 
VCC if needed and lastly data. 
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• VCCIO: The voltage to supply the device with. Qualcomm based devices do not 
need this as a USB cable will be used for power supply. Spreadtrum based devices 
needs 3.3V. 
• Repeat: This sets how many times the program will loop the test. Always set to a 
big number. 
• Delay: Time in seconds between TP identification tries. This gives the necessary 
time to move the testing probe to another testing point. 
 
Figure 19 ATF software setup for eMMC Test Point Identificaiton 
Step 4 
Click on “Find eMMC Test Point” and start looking for the test points. 
4.4.3 Test Points Identification 
Before start looking for TAPs the cables (red and black mentioned in paragraph 4.4.1) 
should connect on the device, external power from a DC power supply can be used as well. 
The crocodile clip of the red cable should connect on the (+) positive battery terminal on 
the device and the black one on the (-) negative one. By placing the battery as it would be 
when the phone is assembled, the examiner can find out which is the (+) and (-) battery 
terminals on the device. Experience has shown that usually the first pin is the (+) and the 
third one is the (-), but always confirm it before connecting the cables. For Nokia Lumia 
635 the first pin is (+) and the second is (-). Finally, adapter and device connection should 
look like in Figure 20. 
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Before starting the process few very important notes should be mentioned: 
• The power button should be pressed during the whole process otherwise it will not 
work. Two of the easiest ways to do this is by using zip tie or a crocodile clip; 
holding it by hand is an option but sometimes this is not very convenient. 
• Keeping in mind that capacitors are brown and resistors are black can be very useful 
and speed up the process as test points can be found either in capacitors only or in 
resistors only. 
o CLK and CMD can be found only on resistors 
o VCC can be bound only on capacitors 
o Data can be found only on resistors 
• Not all devices have CMD and CLK test points visible; this means that the PCB 
should be scratched to reveal the test point. 
• VccQ is always on the opposite side of the CMD. More locations can be found with 
a multimeter. 
• For VCC, another cable connected to a power supply with 3.3V must be used. 
• Wire length should be as small as possible with 15cm maximum length. 
• The order to look for the test points are: 
1. CMD 
2. CLK 
3. VCC (Qualcomm based devices do not need this) 
4. Data 
 
 
Figure 20 ATF-V2 4in1 Adapter 
Now that everything is set up, it is time to start looking for the test points. The process 
continues after the Step 4 from paragraph 4.4.2. Always start looking around the area of the 
eMMC. ATF software has instructions on the “Online Tutorial Links” box. 
Step 1 
Place the tip of the test point probe wire on the resistor and wait for ATF software feedback. 
If the test point is not correct, it will say to try another location and it will pause for two 
seconds (delay). It is recommended to try the same test point more than one time. If the test 
point is correct, a message that says that CMD test point was found will be shown on the 
screen and a sound will play, Figure 21. Now, solder a wire to the CMD test point on the 
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PCB and to the blue connection on ATF adapter to continue for CLK. You cannot proceed 
to the next test point if the previous have not been soldered. 
 
Figure 21 Nokia Lumia 635 CMD TP 
Step 2 (Optional) 
As was previously mentioned, VccQ is always on the opposite side of the CMD. If it is not 
very convenient to solder this TP, another place can be found with the “continuity” option 
on a multimeter. Simply, put one probe on the known VccQ and with the other one start 
probing other resistors until you hear a “beep” sound. VccQ usually operates with 1.8V but 
in order to find the exact voltage a multimeter can be used, simply place the positive probe 
on the VccQ and the negative probe on a ground on the PCB, connect a USB cable and 
check the value on multimeter’s screen. For Qualcomm based devices this step should be 
skipped as they get power from a USB cable. 
Step 3 
Once the CMD is connected properly click again “Find eMMC Test Point” to start looking 
for the CLK. As before, look only on resistors. When the correct CLK test point has been 
found, the program will show it on screen and the sound will play, Figure 22. Connect the 
wire to the corresponding point and continue to step 3. If both red and yellow are on the 
same test point, the program will show it as in Figure 22. In such cases, it is recommended 
to solder on wire on the resistor and later split it in two different to connect them on ATF 
adapter. If only one has been found, solder this wire to the corresponding colour on ATF 
adaptor and repeat step 3 for the other one. Figure 23 shows a close up of the cables con-
nected on the corresponding access points on the PCB while Figure 24 shows the connec-
tions at that point, as said in cases of two access points in one it’s better to solder one cable 
and split it in two.  
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Figure 22 Nokia Lumia 635 CLK TP 
 
Figure 23 CMD (blue) and CLK (yellod and red) wires soldered close up. 
 
Figure 24 CMD (blue) and CLK (yellod and red) wires soldered. 
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Step 4 (Ground) 
In order to find ground points a multitester is needed: first supply the device with power by 
using the battery, a usb cable or an external DC power supplier. Then, on multimeter set 
the knob on “DC”, if is not automatic check the 20V range, touch negative probe on battery 
terminal and with the other start probing test point on PCB, if the screen shows voltage 
value (for example 1.8V or 2.8) it means it is not a ground, if screen shows 0 or very close 
to it (0.01mV) that means that you have found a ground. Connect this point to the ground 
on the ATF adapter. 
Step 5 (Skip in Qualcomm based devices) 
For devices such as Samsung and HTC that VCC is needed, to find the VCC test point 
firstly change the target from “CLK and CMD” to VCC and click on “Find eMMC Test 
Point” to start the loop again. Take another probe wire which is connected on a DC power 
adapter with 3.3V and start probing capacitors, when the probe is connected to the correct 
VCC ATF software will show it on the screen with the same sound as before. VCC is usu-
ally 2.8 or 3.3, again as with VccQ the same process with the multimeter can be used to 
measure the exact voltage. For Qualcomm based devices this step should be skipped as 
well. 
Step 6 
Last step is to find the DATA test point, as before every test point found until now should 
be connected. DATA as CLK and CMD test points can be found only on resistors. When 
the test point for DATA has been found, the program will display it on screen and will play 
the sound as well. Connect this last cable on the device and the device will be ready to read 
(ISP acquisition) or write the eMMC chip. Apart from the message that DATA test point 
has been found, Figure 25, ATF software will show information about the eMMC chip as 
well, Figure 26. 
 
Figure 25 Nokia Lumia 635 DATA TP 
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The information contains details about the eMMC device such as manufacturer, type, prod-
uct name and Serial number, for the eMMC boot information such as partition access, boot 
partition size and user area size which is important for the acquisition later and lastly, it 
contains information on the card such as version, read and write block length. 
 
Figure 26 Nokia Lumia 635 eMMC information 
An advice not only for this process but for others too, is to invest in tools and time. Tools 
such as a good microscope, thin probing wire and thin soldering iron will help on making 
the process of testing and soldering easier, experience will help to do it by finishing this 
process without damaging the device. Figure 27 shows the TAPs found for this device. 
 
Figure 27 Nokia Lumia 635 Test Access Points for eMMC-ISP acquisition 
4.5 ISP Acquisition 
This paragraph can be seen as continuation of the previous one. When the examiner knows 
the test points and everything is connected, the acquisition process can start. For some de-
vices for the connection a jig can be used; jigs are small PCBs which allows to connect to 
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the device’s eMMC TAPs without soldering anything. Each jig is made for one device only, 
as different devices have different location for the test points, and not all devices have jigs. 
The process of the acquisition is very easy and straightforward as long as the soldering was 
done correctly. 
Step 1 
Select “eMMC Tool” tab under Nokia Service - ATF Plus on ATF software. 
Step 2 
Select the CPU type, for this test the “Nokia Lumia – Snapdragon 2,3,4” was selected and 
click “Scan eMMC”. If the connections are solid and connection with the eMMC chip is 
established, the same information as in Figure 26 will be shown on the screen, from “eMMC 
Boot Information” write down the “user area size” for the next step. 
Step 3 
Select partition to dump as well as the size of this partition. The user area written down on 
step 2 was 7818182656 bytes which corresponds to 8GB storage. Select 8GB for “Size” 
and the program will automatically fill the “End Block” by itself, Figure 29. 
Step 4 
Set up the VCCIO, set up the value found for the VccQ. If it’s not known, start from 1.8V 
and move to 3.3V if necessary. For this device, it was irrelevant as the device was powered 
up from a USB cable. 
Step 5 
Set eMMC clock speed 15 MHz; if it does not work, try other values. A look on the chip’s 
datasheet can give information about clock speed but it is easier to try different values. 
Step 6 
Click “READ”, give a name for the disk image output and wait. The program will show on 
screen which partition was selected for reading, the remaining sectors and time left to finish 
the acquisition, Figure 29. 
On the bottom right side on the big red box on left side in Figure 29 it shows the number of 
“Retries”; this numbers represents how many times the ATF box lost communication with 
the eMMC chip. Poor connection is indication of bad soldering; thus, the wires should be 
re-soldered carefully. Also, poor connections have a result of slower acquisition and in 
some cases, it may be unable to finish. 
The tools used in this thesis were not adequate (thick soldering tip and no microscope) for 
this task, which resulted in poor connection. At 49% of the acquisition the connection was 
lost until the program froze and the acquisition stopped completely; 4GB of the memory 
was copied by that time. After lots of unsuccessful attempts to solder the wires again, it was 
not possible. Nevertheless, the disk image was enough to load in UFED for analysis as 
Figure 28 shows. This device was bought for testing purposes for a real case and it was 
completely empty from files and user’s activity. Even though the device was empty and the 
disk image was only half of the actual memory, it was enough to show the process of an 
ISP acquisition and to return evidences when analyzed with a forensic tool. 
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Figure 28 Nokia Lumia 635 ISP disk image analysis with UFED Physical Analyzer 
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Figure 29 ISP Acquisition settings 
4.6 JTAG Acquisition 
JTAG acquisition is similar to ISP but it uses different test points. For the JTAG acquisition, 
Samsung Galaxy S4 I9505 was used. For JTAG acquisition the following tools needed: 
1. Flash box that supports JTAG read option. Riff box is a well-known flash box for 
JTAG. ATF’s box JTAG module has only repair function and not ready. 
2. Flash box software 
3. Soldering iron 
4. Soldering wire 0.04mm or 0.02mm 
5. Digital microscope 
6. DC power supply (not mandatory but useful) 
In this test, the following tools were used: 
1. Riff Box 
2. JTAG Manager for Riff box v1.65 
3. Soldering iron 
4. Soldering wire 0.02mm 
5. JTAG Jig for Samsung Galaxy S4 I9505 
4.6.1 JTAG Test Access Points 
For this part it is assumed that the JTAG pinout interface is already known, the sources to 
look for JTAG pinout as mentioned in paragraph 2.3.2.1 are flash box’s software, Google, 
forums, manually by probing the tips and from device’s schematics. JTAG jigs exists for 
some phones such as the one used for this test. This jig allows to connect the device with 
the flash box for JTAG acquisition without soldering any wires. Jig should be purchased 
separately but the cable to connect the jig with the flash box comes with the flash box. If 
the device is not supported but the JTAG interface pinout is known, similar phone’s (CPU), 
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settings can be tried. Always, a task that is not verified should be tested firstly in another 
device identical to the original one. To find the supported devices from Riff box and the 
JTAG interface pinout follow the steps: 
Step 1 
From “Box service” select “Check for Updates”. 
 
Figure 30 Riff Box “Check for Updates” 
Step 2 
On the “Riff Updates Manager” pop up window select “Resurrectors” under “JTAG Man-
ager Root”. Select manufacturer and look for the device. When the device is located down-
load the file. When the download is finished, Riff box will install the files and software will 
restart. 
 
Figure 31 Downloading device’s necessary files for JTAG 
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Step 3 
Under “Resurrection” tab select “Interface Pinout” to see the JTAG pinout for this device. 
This option is not available for all devices. In that case, examiner should find JTAG pinout 
by himself. Figure 32 shows the pinout interface for the device used in this thesis. 
Step 4 
Solder the wire on phone’s PCB according to Figure 32 or use a jig if available and connect 
it with Riff box. Figure 33 a shows how the cable for soldering on JTAG interface looks 
like and Figure 33 b shows the cable with a JTAG jig. 
 
Figure 32 Resurrector Settings and JTAG Interface Pinout 
 
Figure 33 Riff Box JTAG  connection a) soldering b) jig 
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4.6.2 JTAG Acquisition Process 
When the device is connected with the Riff box, it is time for the acquisition and as with 
ISP the process is relatively simple. 
 
Figure 34 Samsung Galaxy S4 I9505 connected to Riff Box via jig 
Step 1 
Open “JTAG Read/Write” tab. 
Step 2 
On “Ressurector Settings” select device manufacturer and model. This option will show 
only the models you have downloaded before, as explained in the previous paragraph. If 
the device is not supported, proceed on Step 3 otherwise on Step 4. 
Step 3 
In case of a device not supported from Riff box, select “Custom JTAG Target Settings”.   
• “JTAG TCK Speed” start with maximum and start lowering every time.  
• “Target Core” select device’s CPU; if not supported, select a similar one if possible. 
Any unverified test should be done firstly in another device identical to the original. 
• JTAG I/O start with 1.8V and change to higher values if necessary. 
Step 4 
At the beginning, only the last four options are clickable. Click “Connect & Get ID”, if the 
connection is established, a message that a “dead body” was detected will be shown and all 
options will be now clickable, Figure 35. 
Step 5 
Click “Read Memory” and wait until the program has finished. It may need to try few times 
until it works, Figure 35. 
Step 6 
Analyze the disk image with any forensic tool. 
For this process, a DC power supply was used and during the setup due to a misconfigura-
tion or hardware fault the power supplier provided a huge amount of current which damaged 
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the device in an unrecoverable way, at least with current tools and time. Due to this event, 
it was not possible to perform a JTAG acquisition. This unfortunate event can be a reminder 
on how careful an examiner should be when he is working with original devices in real 
cases. 
 
Figure 35 Riff Box JTAG Read/Write Tab 
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5 Conclusion and Future Work 
Nowadays more than 2 billion people own a smartphone and this number is growing rap-
idly, which makes mobile forensics a very important part of the digital forensic science. 
The big variety οf manufacturers, devices and the state a device can be can make the data 
acquisition a very easy or very difficult task. The data acquisition can be categorized in 
logical, file system and physical and each category can have more than one techniques ap-
plicable. Some of the data acquisitions are as easy as connecting the device on a specific 
device e.g. Cellebrite UFED Touch logical acquisition, while some others are more ad-
vanced, with a risk of damaging the device e.g. JTAG and ISP acquisition. 
This study focused mostly on giving an overview of the JTAG and ISP acquisition but also 
some information regarding the different types of acquisitions as well as cases of encrypted 
device. 
To begin with the types of acquisition, this study showed that in terms of evidences regard-
ing the usage of a device all three acquisitions are equivalent, but when it comes to actual 
files such as images, videos and documents the physical acquisition gives the most infor-
mation of them all. Thus, it is recommended to start with the logical acquisition and only if 
necessary to perform a file system or physical acquisition. 
There are few different ways that an examiner can perform a physical acquisition with two 
emerging techniques being JTAG and ISP. The main goal of this study was to provide some 
information about these techniques. As this study showed, both techniques are not easy and 
the device can be easily damaged. Special tools, hardware and software needed, and the 
connection process (between device and computer through a flash box) can be very diffi-
cult. Once the difficult part of the connection has been made, the read process is very easy 
and the dump taken is equivalent to any other physical acquisition technique and can be 
used for forensic analysis. 
One of the main problems of these two acquisition techniques,  is the access points in which 
you have to connect the device. In cases in which these points are not known, a manual 
identification can be performed. In this study, only the process to identify the access points 
for an ISP acquisition was tested. The process is relatively simple but there can be cases in 
which this process can be difficult such as when a test point is hidden and the surface of the 
PCB has to be scratched; in these cases, experience will make all the difference. 
Finally, one of the tests was performed on an encrypted device, which resulted in zero evi-
dences. This test put a question mark on the future of the mobile forensics as all 
smartphones start having encryption enabled by default. 
As technology is moving forward very fast, many researches are already obsolete and fur-
ther tests will always be needed. The two main tests that have to be done that are related to 
this thesis are chip-off acquisition techniques and creating a clone of the original device 
with JTAG, ISP or chip-off acquisition. For the chip-off acquisition most people think about 
expensive adapters in which the eMMC chip is mounted, but ISP acquisition can be per-
formed by connecting directly on the chip instead of a PCB. There are many cases in which 
the evidences to catch a suspect can be found by using the device pretending to be the owner 
and communication with someone else who may be a suspect. Looking for such evidences 
can be resulting to the alteration or deletion of other evidences. Thus, what is proposed as 
future work is to obtain a full disk image using JTAG, ISP or chip-off acquisition from the 
original device and then again with one of these techniques write the disk image to the clone 
device (should be the exact same as the original) and use the clone device as if it was the 
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original one. In that way, the extra evidences would have been found and the original device 
will remain intact.  
To sum all up, simpler and less risky data acquisition should be tried first and move on to 
more advanced methods only if the previous ones were not adequate. JTAG and ISP acqui-
sition should be performed from experienced examiners that should always be very careful. 
For most acquisitions Cellebrite UFED Touch 2 (newest version of Cellebrite UFED 
Touch) is the best option, for JTAG and ISP the following tools are the most appropriate:  
• Riff Box with its software (JTAG) 
• Advanced Turbo Flasher with its software (ISP) 
• Soldering iron with thin tip 
• Bridging wire 0.02mm 
• A good microscope at least 10x 
• External DC power supply 
• VR Table for eMMC and JTAG (not mandatory but very useful, and expensive, as 
you do not need to solder wires) 
Finally, If the device is encrypted, then there are not many things that an examiner can do, 
so alternatives should be considered.  
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Appendix 
I. Hash Comparison Python Script 
ufed = "ufed.txt" 
ufed_dic = {} 
dd = "dd.txt" 
dd_dic = {} 
sum = 0 
 
#Open ufed userdata image file hash list 
#And creates a dictionary with main key the MD5 value 
with open(ufed) as f: 
    for line in f: 
        md5 = line.split(",")[0] 
        sha1 = line.split(",")[1] 
        file_name = line.split(",")[2] 
        ufed_dic[md5] = {'sha1': sha1, 'file_name': file_name} 
         
#Open dd userdata image file hash list 
#And creates a dictionary with main key the MD5 value 
with open(dd) as f: 
    for line in f: 
        md5 = line.split(",")[0] 
        sha1 = line.split(",")[1] 
        file_name = line.split(",")[2] 
        dd_dic[md5] = {'sha1': sha1, 'file_name': file_name} 
 
#Checks which files from ufed hash list they do not exist 
#on dd hash list based on the MD5 value 
for md5_dd_to_check in ufed_dic: 
    if md5_dd_to_check in dd_dic: 
        sum += 1 
    else: 
        print(ufed_dic[md5_dd_to_check]) 
print(sum) 
 
#Checks which files from dd hash list they do not exist 
#on ufed hash list based on the MD5 value 
sum = 0 
for md5_dd_to_check in dd_dic: 
    if md5_dd_to_check in ufed_dic: 
        sum += 1 
    else: 
        print(dd_dic[md5_dd_to_check]) 
print(sum) 
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II. Media Files and Application Setup 
Media files16
Camera\20170207_111614.jpg 
Camera\20170207_111632.jpg 
Camera\20170207_111641.jpg 
Documents\ICMP covert.pdf 
Documents\SWGDE_Best_Prac-
tices_for_Examining_Mobile_Phones_Us-
ing_JTAG.pdf 
Documents\SWGDE_Best_Prac-
tices_for_Mobile_Phone_Foren-
sics.pdf 
Documents\SWGDE_Core_Compe-
tencies_for_Mobile_Phone_Foren-
sics.pdf 
Download\Best Practices for Incident Re-
sponders Collecting Electronic Evi-
dence.pdf 
Download\NIST.SP.800-101r1.pdf 
Download\SWGDE_Best_Prac-
tices_for_Chip-Off.pdf 
Download\SWGDE_Best_Prac-
tices_for_Collection_of_Damaged_Mo-
bile_Devices.pdf 
Pictures\20160811_140758.jpg 
Pictures\20160821_183231.jpg 
Pictures\20161023_114837.jpg 
Pictures\Ampelakia_0007.JPG 
Pictures\Ampelakia_0031.JPG 
Pictures\DSC_002.JPG 
Pictures\DSC_0195.jpg 
Pictures\DSC_0255.JPG 
Pictures\DSC_027.JPG 
Pictures\DSC_031.jpg 
Pictures\DSC_0326.jpg 
Pictures\DSC_0429.jpg 
Pictures\DSC_0477.jpg 
Pictures\DSC_0662.jpg 
Pictures\DSC_068.jpg 
Pictures\DSC_069.jpg 
Pictures\DSC_071.jpg 
Pictures\DSC_122.JPG 
Pictures\DSC_156.jpg 
Pictures\DSC_174.jpg 
Pictures\DSC_175.jpg 
                                                 
16 Red cells indicates deleted files. 
Pictures\DSC_195.jpg 
Pictures\DSC_298.jpg 
Pictures\DSC_300.jpg 
Pictures\DSC_445.jpg 
Pictures\DSC_7960.jpg 
Pictures\DSC_7993.jpg 
Pictures\DSC_8086.jpg 
Pictures\Fortress.jpg 
Pictures\G0013126.JPG 
Pictures\G0177901.jpg 
Pictures\GOPR1405.jpg 
Pictures\GOPR2873.jpg 
Pictures\green owl.jpg 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (1).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (11).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (12).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (13).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (14).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (16).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (17).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (18).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (19).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (2).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (21).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (22).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (23).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (24).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (26).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (27).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (28).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (29).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (3).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (31).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (32).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (33).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (34).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (36).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (37).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (38).jpg 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (39).jpg 
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Pictures\Gr_Cf (4).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (41).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (42).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (43).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (44).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (46).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (47).jpg 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (48).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (49).jpg 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (51).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (52).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (53).jpg 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (54).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (56).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (57).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (58).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (59).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (6).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (61).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (62).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (63).jpg 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (64).jpg 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (66).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (67).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (68).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (69).jpg 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (7).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (71).jpg 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (72).jpg 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (73).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (74).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (76).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (77).jpg 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (78).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (79).jpg 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (8).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (81).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (9).JPG 
Pictures\LG_20160219_131716.jpg 
Pictures\LG_20160219_131744.jpg 
Pictures\LG_20160219_132653.jpg 
Pictures\Misc\Angry Owl.jpg 
Pictures\Misc\DSC_0190.JPG 
Pictures\Misc\DSC_0191.JPG 
Pictures\Misc\DSC_0328.jpg 
Pictures\Misc\DSC_0339.JPG 
Pictures\Misc\Landing In Mos-
cow.MP4 
Pictures\Misc\Night TimeLapse.mp4 
Pictures\Misc\Panoramic Bal-
cony.mp4 
Pictures\Nature\Ampelakia_0018.JPG 
Pictures\Nature\DSC_0041.JPG 
Pictures\Nature\DSC_0367.JPG 
Pictures\Nature\DSC_040.jpg 
Pictures\Nature\G0057648.jpg 
Pictures\Random\Ampe-
lakia_0061.JPG 
Pictures\Random\Colored birds.jpg 
Pictures\Random\DSC_0567.jpg 
Pictures\Random\DSC_362.jpg 
Pictures\Random\GOPR2883.jpg 
Pictures\Ran-
dom\LG_20160219_131618.jpg 
Telegram pic-
ture\423640518_95206.jpg 
Documents\Rubik's Cube 3x3 
Guide.pdf 
Pictures\Liza.jpg 
Pictures\DSC_197.jpg 
Pictures\DSC_0047.JPG 
Pictures\Misc\DSC_229.jpg 
Pictures\Misc\Guangzhou 23rd Floor 
Balcony View.mp4 
Pictures\Nature\DSC_0016.JPG 
Pictures\Nature\DSC_0578.jpg 
Pictures\Random\Watercolor Lion.jpg 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (5).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (10).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (15).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (20).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (25).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (30).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (35).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (40).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (45).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (50).jpg 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (55).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (60).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (65).JPG 
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Pictures\Gr_Cf (70).JPG 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (75).jpg 
Pictures\Gr_Cf (80).JPG 
Device 
 
Device Status 
• Official ROM 
• Rooted with SuperSU Free v.279 
• TWRP 2.8.4.0 custom recovery 
Google Searches 
• ttu 
• Forensic 
• Samsung S4 
• Android 
• Samsung S7 Edge 
• Ars Technica 
Visited URLs 
• https://www.ttu.ee/en 
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foren-
sic_science 
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JTAG 
• http://www.gsmarena.com/sam-
sung_i9500_galaxy_s4-5125.php 
                                                 
17 Contacts are not available in every test. 
• http://gadgets.ndtv.com/samsung-
galaxy-s4-542 
• https://www.android.com/ 
• https://www.google.com/pho-
tos/about/ 
• http://www.sam-
sung.com/global/galaxy/galaxy-s7/ 
• www.e-shop.gr 
• http://www.crazysundays.gr/ 
• m.ebay.com/?_mwBanner=1 
• https://arstechnica.com/ 
• https://arstechnica.com/ap-
ple/2017/02/testing-out-snapshots-
in-apples-next-generation-apfs-file-
system/ 
YouTube 
• Nerf War: First Person Shooter 9 
• Android Authority 
Email 
• ttuthesis@gmail.com 
Contacts17 
• Aleks: 51981414 
• Maria: 51986542 
• Stefanos: 51984343 
• Me: 0037251981234 
Installed Applications 
• TWRP v2.8.4.0 
• SuperSU Free v2.79 
• BusyBox Free 1.262 
• Telegram 
Actions 
• Email from ttuthesis@gmail.com to 
thesisttu@gmail.com and vice versa. 
• Exchange instant messages with Tel-
egram 
• Connect to “LP” Wi-Fi 
• Browse the internet with Chrome 
and watch videos on YouTube 
 
 
 III. Cellebrite UFED Touch Logical, File System and Physical Ac-
quisition 
 
Figure 36 UFED summary extraction of logical,file system and physical 
acquisition 
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IV. Physical Acquisition with “dd” command. 
In order to use “dd” command on an Android device for full disk image or just to 
dump a specific partition the device must be rooted, with custom recovery and Bus-
yBox installed as well. The process to root a device and flash custom recovery is not 
the same for all devices so this part will be omitted. 
From the computer side, all that is needed is “adb” tool and Cygwin for Windows 
computers. Cygwin provides Windows a variety of open source tools from Linux, 
the one needed is “netcat” but “pv”, which is useful for checking the progress. The 
steps are: 
1. Boot the device into recovery mode and connect it to the computer. Disk 
image of some partitions, userdata included, can be obtained even with the 
device being booted normally, debugging should be enabled. 
2. Mount the available partitions; system is the important one. 
3. Open terminal on a computer and verify that the PC can talk to the device 
with the “adb devices” command. It should return the device’s number and 
status, in this case recovery. 
4. Then run “adb forward tcp:1111 tcp:1111” to forward the data on this port. 
Port number can be anything. 
5. Then “adb shell” to get access to device’s terminal. 
6. Once inside the device, look for the name of the block for acquisition. On the 
paragraph 2.3.2.4 was mentioned how to find the block. The block on Sam-
sung Galaxy S4 GT-I9505 can be seen on the Figure 1. The blocks and the 
corresponding names can be seen on the Figure 2, this is not available for all 
devices. For full disk image choose the main block (mmcblk0). 
7. Run the command “/system/xbin/busybox nc -l -p 1111 -e /system/xbin/busy-
box dd if=/dev/block mmcblk0”. This command it reads the block specified 
and sends the data to the port mentioned. 
8. Open a second Cygwin terminal this time, run the “adb forward tcp:1111 
tcp:1111”, port should be the same with the one on the other terminal. 
9. Run the command “nc 127.0.0.1 | pv -i 1 > mmcblk0.raw”. This command 
listens on the loopback address for the data that is being sent from the device 
and writes it in a file with the name “mmcblk0.raw”. The “pv” command is 
used to give an update for the process every one second. The process can be 
seen on the Figure 37; the screenshot was from the encrypted partition thus 
the name “mmcblk_enc.raw”. 
55 
 
 
Figure 37 Commands for full disk image on a Windows computer. 
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